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	 Abstract 
Due to the climate warming effects the glacier lakes of  the Khumbu has started to form and 
grow in size and the natural moraine dams give poor support to the expanding lakes. In order 
to find out how much the sherpa people wants to contribute to build the safety measures that 
can protect them from the effects of  a glacier lake outburst flood this paper investigates their 
willingness to contribute with work time. The work time can be used to work on strengthening 
the dam and settlements along the upper Dudh Kosi river. The willingness to contribute was 
investigated to see if  it is affected by others contribution and if  the contribution levels varies 
with socioeconomic variables such as income, perceived risk level and gender.  
The finding of  this paper is that the willingness to cooperate amongst the sherpas of  the 
upper Dudh Kosi river basin increases with others contribution. 
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Introduction 
The Hindu Kush Himalayas contains the highest concentration of  glaciers, snow and 
permafrost in the world. It is a source of  ten major rivers of  Asia that supports over 1.3 billion 
of  people down stream with water (International centre for integrated mountain development 
(ICIMOD), 2016). 
The average temperature of  Nepal is increasing by 0,06 degrees celsius per year due to 
climate change but the temperature in the Himalayas is increasing at a faster rate (Prasai, 
2010). The glaciers melts and retreats at a high rate and this retreat causes the formation of  
new glacial lakes and enlargement of  existing ones due to accumulation of  meltwater. The 
meltwater lakes are poorly supported by moraine dams that are a potential source of  danger 
for the people of  the valleys below. In Nepal there have been several glacier lake outburst 
(GLOF) events in recent years with Bhote Koshi and Sun Koshi events of  1964 and 1981 and 
the Dig Tsho event of  1985. The Dig Tsho event destroyed the almost finished Namche Small 
Hydroelectric Project in addition to causing damage further downstream. (ICIMOD, 2011) 
There are several ways of  mitigating the impact of  GLOFs. One way is to decrease the 
climate change and the climate warming gases causing it but locally in these high Himalayan 
valleys it is more a question of  adapting to the effects of  the GLOF event. Decreasing the 
volume of  the lake can be done by controlling the outlet of  the lake by drainage. Structural 
mitigation measures can be built to river bank settlements, intakes and bridges downstream so 
that the structures will hold when the flood occurs. There is also a possibility of  preventing 
trigger events such as snow or ice avalanches with structural measures so that displacement 
waves can not occur. (ICIMOD, 2011) 
The expected economic damage of  a GLOF event is the combination of  the probability of  
the event and its negative consequences (ICIMOD, 2011). The ICIMOD (2011) assessment 
does not project a future frequency of  GLOF events but it states that the glaciers of  Hindu 
Kush Himalaya melts and retreats at an increasing rate. According to Kaltenborn, Nellemann 
and Vistnes (2010) the frequency of  the GLOF events in the same area are increasing. Hence 
this paper assumes that the probability of  an GLOF event will increase in a future state of  the 
world. Also, if  the land use increases the negative consequences of  such an event will increase 
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and hence the expected economic damage in this future state of  the world will increase 
(Nussbaumer, Schaub, Hugger & Walz, 2014).      
In order for the local community to adapt to the future effects of  a GLOF event it is 
important to understand how much they are willing to do this and under which circumstances 
this willingness is formed. This paper aim to test how many working hours the population of  
the upper Dudh Kosi valley would contribute with in order to adapt to the effects of  a GLOF 
event given their beliefs about others contribution, and whether they would increase their 
contribution given that they are informed that the other households contribution is twice as 
high as their contribution. The paper will also try to find the main socio economic causes for 
this contribution. This study can serve as information for a decision of  authorities or local 
groups so they can see how much the people along the upper Dudh Kosi are willing to 
contribute with work time to adapt to climate changes and under which conditions this 
willingness forms. 
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Literature review 
The stated preference method is used to valuate willingness to adapt to future floods. There 
are several papers of  interest about willingness to pay for measures in order to adapt to floods 
created by climate change. Some investigates the willingness to pay for a whole agricultural 
program of  which the flood risk adaption is a part (Ahmed, Masud, Al-Amin, Yahaya, 
Rahman & Akhtar, 2015; Masud, Junsheng, Akhtar, Al-Amin & Kari, 2014). Others 
investigates willingness to pay for adapting to floods by insurance, elevating houses, 
embankments or building better waste water systems (Botzen & van der Berg, 2012; Botzen, 
Aerts & van der Berg, 2012; Sharier & Kotani, 2016; Veronesi, Chawla, Maurer & Lienert, 
2013). All papers uses the the stated preference method in order to find the willingness to pay 
for climate change adaption of  the investigated populations. Veronesi et al (2013) uses the 
choice experiment method while the other authors uses the contingent valuation method. 
The choice experiment gives more information but is harder to answer. In a comparative 
study Hanley, McMillan, Wright, Bullock, Simpson, Parsisson & Crabtree (1998) finds that 
the choice experiment method is more effective of  evaluating the marginal willingness. Since 
this paper is investigating the willingness to adapt to the effects a future GLOF event in rural 
Nepal it uses the contingent valuation method since it evaluates the total willingness to pay for 
a future policy. 
The literature of  Ahmed et al (2015); Masud et al (2014); Botzen and van der Berg (2012); 
Botzen, Aerts and van der Berg (2012); Sharier and Kotani, (2016); Veronesi, Chawla, 
Maurer and Lienert (2013) are all controlling for socio economic causes of  willingness to pay 
for adapting to floods like education, income and age and it helped this paper to find a 
sensible selection of  socio economic determinants. In addition to this Ahmed et al (2015); 
Masud et al (2014); Botzen, Aerts and van der Berg (2012); Botzen and van der Berg (2012) 
investigates the motivating factors that affects the willingness to pay. The authors claims that 
one motivating factor for willingness to pay for adaption is if  the respondent is concerned 
about the risks of  climate change or if  the respondent feels responsible for the climate 
changes. Therefore it is important to investigate how the respondents of  this paper perceives 
the risk of  a future GLOF event. Moreover Botzen, Aerts and van der Berg (2012); Botzen 
and van der Berg (2012) finds that the respondents willing to invest in elevating houses had a 
higher willingness to pay than the respondents that was willing to pay for an insurance that 
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decreases the financial risk of  a flood. This means that the respondent finds it more 
interesting to reduce the economic damage of  a flood rather than to buy financial security 
and still be exposed to the risk. Thus it is important to investigate the willingness to pay for 
safety measures that decreases the economic damage of  a GLOF event. Ahmed et al (2015) 
and Masud et al (2014) states that another motivating factor that affects the willingness to pay 
is if  the respondent thinks that the environment has the right to be protected irrespective of  
the cost. Masud et al (2014) claims that this factor had low priority amongst the respondents 
and recognizes that the most important motivating factor is the environmental impact on 
their own agricultural production. Hence the strongest motivating factors seems to be the 
factors that affects the respondents private economy (Ahmed et al, 2015; Masud et al, 2014; 
Botzen, Aerts & van der Berg, 2012; Botzen & van der Berg, 2012). Therefore it is of  
importance to investigate if  the respondents owns land in the research area but also important 
to report the flood effects on private property in the scenario of  the survey. 
Is the willingness to pay a limited evaluation tool when the respondents are poor? Sharier and 
Kotani (2016) finds that poor and less educated people in coastal Bangladesh tends to choose 
the willingness to donate labor instead of  willingness to pay when adapting to cyclone floods. 
Similarly Rai, Nepal, Shyamsundar and Bhatta (2014) finds that 50 per cent of  the 
respondents are willing to pay with money in order to adapt to water scarcity in the Koshi 
river basin but this willingness increases to 75 per cent when asked to contribute with work 
time. The authors argues that the low income level and budget constraint of  the respondents 
makes the willingness to pay a limited way of  measuring the willingness to adapt. On the 
other hand the authors Casiwan-Launio, Shinbo and Morooka (2011) claims that in order to 
compare the two modes of  payments amongst poor people in a valuation framework it is 
necessary to have knowledge about the respondents alternative cost of  time and the local 
labor market. The difference in willingness levels between monetary- and labor contribution 
amongst poor people motivates this papers method of  evaluating willingness to contribute 
with work time since the population of  this paper is assumed to be equally poor and limited 
with similar budget constraints.  
In addition, when changing payment mode from monetary- to labor payment, it is important 
to find out if  the respondents decision to contribute with work time is affected by information 
about the other households contribution. This behavior is defined as conditional cooperation 
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(Frey & Meyer, 2003; Ostrom, 1990). The change of  contribution with information about the 
other players has been investigated using public goods games and these experiments finds that 
the individual contribution in many cases increases with more information about the others 
contribution (Fischbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 2001; Cartwright & Lovett, 2014). Again the 
conditional contribution can also be investigated in a real life setting (Heldt, 2005) using non 
student field experiments. The field experiment methods uses questionnaires about willingness 
to pay to elicit the conditional contributions and the public goods games uses constructed 
scenarios with a limited amount of  tokens to spend amongst the players. The public goods 
games get the results in a more controlled way and the field experiments have the advantage 
of  resembling the choices of  a real life setting. On the other hand the results of  the above 
experiments on conditional behavior contradicts the theory of  altruism which according to 
Croson (2007) and Sugden (1984) predicts less contribution if  the respondent is informed of  
the other households increased contribution. This since the personal utility of  the altruistic 
respondent is fulfilled by the others contribution and the need for a contribution is reduced 
(Becker, 1974). The conflict between the literature on the theory of  altruism (Margolis, 1982; 
Becker, 1974) that predicts less contribution given information and the literature on theory of  
reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Sugden, 1984) or theory conformity (Carpenter, 2004) that predicts 
more contribution given information can be explained by the different economic behaviors 
they are trying to explain.   
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Background 
According to ICIMOD (2011) the scenario of  a GLOF event includes expected economic 
damage due to destruction of  infrastructure, real estate and conditions for economic valuable 
activities. Three lakes, of  which the possibility of  a future GLOF could not be dismissed, was 
investigated in different perspectives with potential risk in mind. The conclusion was that the 
local communities needs to become more aware of  the GLOF hazard and a new policy needs 
to be developed so that the awareness, early warning and mitigation issues could be solved. 
Although ICIMOD (2011) risk assessment study can not predict if  the rate of  the GLOF 
events will increase in the future Kaltenborn, Nellemann and Vistnes (2010) claims that the 
rate of  these events will increase in times to come. With the fact that the climate change melts 
the Hindu Kush glaciers at an increasing rate (Pasai, 2010; Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), 2014) this paper assumes higher risk of  GLOF events in the future 
state of  the world. Nussbaumer et al (2014) have focused on trying to quantify the expected 
damage of  a GLOF event over time and they find that the expected damage of  a GLOF 
event in 2045 increases with different land use. According to Worldbank (2014) a good 
strategy for the Nepal economy is to focus on its growth sectors which is hydro power and 
tourism. Both sectors can be expected to increase land use in the flood prone areas and 
therefore increase the future expected economic damage of  a GLOF event even further.  
In order to adapt to the risks of  future GLOF events in Nepal a three-year project called 
”Nepal: Community Based Flood and Glacial Lake Outburst Risk Reduction” has been 
implemented and this project has been focusing on early warning systems, development of  
GLOF programmes and raising awareness of  climate change amongst the local districts. The 
government of  Pakistan and UNDP has implemented a project in the two districts of  Gilgit-
Baltistan and Chitral in Pakistan. The project is aiming to raise awareness of  GLOF events 
but also to install early warning systems in the projects areas. A five-year project in Bhutan 
was aiming at creating a practical framework to assess the dangers of  GLOFs for the local 
people of  the two valleys which are considered to be the most threatened sites of  the country. 
An early warning system was also implemented in the Punakha-Wangdi valley of  Bhutan. 
(ICIMOD, 2016)   
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Theoretical background 
Different goods can be divided into four groups according to table 1.  
	 	 Exclusion 	 No exclusion 
Rivalry	 Private good	 Open-access 
	 	 	 	 common property 
No rivalry	 Club good	 Public good 
Table 1. Rivalry and exclusion 
It is very hard to exclude anyone from the services of  the measures taken to adapt to the 
effects of  a GLOF event. Therefore the services of  adapting to a GLOF event is considered a 
public good and so the problem of  free riding will occur. Free riding is when people benefit 
from the collective work without contributing themselves. The free riders can not be excluded 
from using the public good because the property rights of  the public good can not easily be 
defined. (Perloff, 2015) 
The theory of  free riding can be explained by the Nash equilibrium of  the prisoners dilemma 
which is when none of  the individuals in a game would gain more utility by changing strategy. 
The utility outcomes of  table 2 can be used to define the supposed behavior of  the people in 
the upper Dudh Kosi valley when deciding to contribute with work time or not. 
	 	 Contribute2	 Defect2 
Contribute1 	 (21,22)	 	 (01,32) 
Defect1	 (31,02)	 	 (11,12) 
Table 2. Prisoners dilemma utilities 
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The utility of  individual one is the first number in the parentheses and the strategies of  
individual one are described by the left column. The utility of  individual two is the second 
number in the parentheses and the strategies of  individual two are described by the top row. 
Given the strategy of  one individual is unchanged it does not matter from which of  the 
positions the other individual change to the defect strategy, this individual will gain utility. 
Given the defect strategy of  one individual is unchanged and one individual changes to the 
contribute strategy from the lower right position this individual will loose utility. Hence, the 
dominant strategy for both individuals is to defect since none of  the individuals gains more 
utility by changing from this strategy. This equilibrium is the Nash equilibrium and will cause 
both individuals choosing the dominant strategy of  free riding even if  they receive 
information about the other individuals actions. (Perloff, 2015) 
A rational and self-interested individual would maximize her own utility given the others 
contribution and not contribute with work time to a public good such as building safety 
measures for a GLOF event. But it is not always that pure economic self  interest decides how 
an individual will act. Sometimes we use norms to decide our actions. The theory of  
conditional cooperation states that higher contribution rates will occur when information is 
provided about how much others contribute (Frey & Meyer, 2003). The members of  the 
group makes a comparison with the others and creates a norm that will have large effect on 
the contribution (ibid). It has also been shown that conditional contributors can contribute 
before they know the norm only by believing a majority of  the members will contribute 
(Ostrom, 1990). Another way of  describing the causality between these beliefs and the 
contribution is presented by Ross, Green & House (1977) who argues that people might form 
beliefs as to justify their own behavior. That is, beliefs might not cause contribution but the 
other way around - contribution causes beliefs. 
Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001); Cartwright and Lovett (2014) investigates how the 
contribution changes if  information about the others contribution is provided in a public 
goods game. They find that half  of  the players of  the game do not let their personal gain of  
utility influence their decision but chooses conditional contribution by comparing themselves 
to the others. Cartwright and Lovett (2014) finds that the contribution with no information 
given about the other players contributions is depending on the personal gain of  utility the 
players get of  the outcome. This behavior is called unconditional contribution.  
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Conditional contribution might happen for several reasons. One reason mentioned by 
Carpenter (2004) is conformity which is when people fear breaking the norm created by the 
group. Another, described by Rabin (1993), is reciprocity which is a reaction to perceived 
kindness of  other people. Feldt (2005) finds that age has a positive correlation with conditional 
contribution in one of  the first non student field experiments in a public goods context. Feldt 
(2005) also argues that the group that is informed contributes at a higher rate. This result 
contrasts with the theory of  altruism which implies that an individual would decrease its own 
contribution if  informed of  the others contribution since the need for a contribution is 
reduced (Sugden, 1984). In this case the utility of  the individual is not defined only by its own 
consumption but also by the consumption of  the others (ibid). 
Empirical question 
The empirical question of  this paper is how many working hours the population of  the upper 
Dudh Kosi valley would contribute to adapt to the effects of  a GLOF event given their beliefs 
about others contribution, and wether they would increase their contribution given that they 
are informed that the other households contribution is twice as high as their own 
contribution. The paper will also try to find the main socio economic causes for this 
contribution.  
The scenario of  the investigation is that the expected economic damage of  a GLOF event in 
the Imja Lake is high and increasing and lives and houses within the flood prone area are 
directly exposed to this risk. The other households in an extended area are indirectly exposed 
to this expected damage through loss of  income. The data is collected along a stretch of  25 
km down stream from Imja Lake by making the respondents fill in a survey. The survey can 
be found in appendix 2. A map of  the area is attached as appendix 1. 
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Experimental design and process 
The sample 
The choice between potential research sites are singled out by the factors GLOF risk, 
accessibility, english proficiency amongst the people in the research area and the 2015 
earthquake effects in the area. This paper chose to follow the ICIMOD (2011) prioritization 
of  critical lakes since the GLOF risk is very high and the access is good at all three sites. A 
guide was hired in order to translate the interviews with respondents with low english 
proficiency. The 2015 earthquake is supposed to have effect on the answers in the way that if  
the respondent just experienced effects of  an earthquake it might be impossible to contribute 
with work on safety measures to prevent another catastrophe. The choice was between Lake 
Thulagi, Lake Rolpa and Imja Lake. The language barrier was considered to be higher at 
Lake Rolpa since there are less tourists there (ICIMOD, 2011). The 2015 earthquake effects 
were more severe at Lake Thulagi (ICIMOD, 2016) and therefore Lake Imja was chosen. 
Lake Imja is situated in Sagarmartha national park which attracts many tourists that comes to 
Nepal. All contributing factors were checked with the contact person of  this investigation - 
Ganesh Sharma - which organizes climbing expeditions to Nepal. 
The resident sherpas of  the upper Dudh Kosi valley can be expected to be a small group with 
strong social ties interested in collective action according to the definition of  Ostrom (1990) 
and will make up the sub population of  the sampling. The sampling itself  was designed with 
the condition that the investigator would collect the cross section data by foot amongst the 
resident sherpas. The area of  sampling is along the Dudh Kosi river between Namche Bazar 
and the Imja Lake in both high risk villages and other villages. The resident households was 
identified by asking the respondents if  they were residents. There was a suspicion that it 
would be more problematic interviewing women since they according to our contact person 
would be more prone to stay indoors which due to sherpa custom is harder to reach without 
invitation. The interviewer tried to interview not only one part of  the village but distribute the 
interviews uniformly through out the village. The sample size was limited by the time 
restriction of  the data collection. When leaving the research site the sample size was at the 
level of  66 due to this time restriction. There were no budget to cover the costs of  the guide 
and translator for more than the 66 answers that were sampled.  
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Problems with the data collection 
The data collection needs to be commented because of  several reasons. One is the rough 
terrain. In the steep and high altitude terrain it takes time and effort to reach the villages of  
the sub population safely and this gives limited time for data collection. The size of  the 
sample therefore became smaller than initially planned. The second reason for commenting 
the sample is the translation and the language barrier. The survey had to be filled in by the 
interviewer and the questions were translated on site by the guide. It was difficult to make sure 
that the guide fully understood the survey questions and it was hard to know if  the translated 
questions reflected the questions of  the survey well. Therefore the meaning of  the scenario 
and the questions can get distorted and create bias to the data. It was also hard to know if  the 
questions were fully understood by the respondents. The respondents misconception of  the 
questions can give bias to the data as well. The third reason to comment on the data 
collection is that the interview was personal but often other persons of  the household or 
persons of  other households were sitting next to the respondent. This kind of  non anonymous 
interview situation can be an explanation to an upwards bias of  the contribution level since 
the respondent can be influenced by the others that are sitting and listening. According to 
Patel and Davidsson (2003) the interview shall to the largest extent possible be anonymous so 
the respondents answers can be uninfluenced of  the other people attending the interview.  But 
the situation of  the interview, often in the kitchens with families or friends, made it hard to ask 
the remaining individuals to step out after being invited to their home. Therefore it was hard 
to prevent this bias. One thing that could have improved the anonymity of  the interviews 
would have been if  the survey was translated to the nepalese language. Then the respondents 
could have filled in the survey without any pressure from the other persons in the group. A 
fourth reason to comment on the data collection is the selection process. Our guide has many 
sherpa friends in the investigation area and a handful of  them were interviewed. Our guide 
was informed that the selection was supposed to be random and when entering the kitchens 
of  the respondents homes there was no sign of  our guide knowing the respondents. It seemed 
that our guide always told us when the respondent was a friend but it was hard to recognize 
the social codes of  the sherpas to check this assumption. If  the sample was overrepresented by 
our guides friends there might be a lot of  trekking guides in the sample. The trekking industry 
is large in the investigation area and even if  none of  the respondents were our guides friends 
there would be a large share of  trekking guides in the sample.  
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The survey design 
First in the survey, that can be found in appendix 2, there are questions that refers to the age, 
gender and nationality of  the respondent. For instance, old people can be expected to care 
more about the environment which is tested here.  
In order to put the respondent in the right frame of  mind this paper uses a carefully 
constructed scenario in the introduction of  the survey. The scenario gives the respondent 
some basic information to motivate the upcoming questions of  the survey. When constructing 
a scenario a conflict arises between how much information the survey can give and how much 
it needs to give. Most respondents can not handle to much information and given the 
language and illiteracy problems a short scenario was constructed. The information of  the 
scenario contains the future change of  the expected damage of  a GLOF event with a 
reference to current research. This to show the respondents that a contribution is needed. 
The information of  what needs to be done to protect the respondents of  a GLOF event is 
also presented in order for the respondents to decide if  they can contribute with work time. 
The work tasks are strengthening roads, strengthening bridges, improving structural measures 
to river bank settlements, controlling the outlet of  the glacier lake dam and strengthening the 
glacier lake dam. It was confirmed with our guide and the secretary of  the local sherpa 
association in Namche Bazar that no steps were taken to adapt to future GLOF events since 
then there is no need for the respondents to contribute with work time. 
The respondents that for some reason can not contribute are identified with a question that 
asks the respondent if  someone in the household is willing to contribute with work time to 
help your local community with GLOF safety measures. If  the respondents answer is no there 
can be several reasons for this, for example that the respondents can not afford to contribute 
or that they are free riders. 
After this section comes the part of  the survey that tests the contribution with some open 
ended questions about contribution. The question ”how many hours per month is your 
household willing to contribute to help your local community with glacier lake outburst flood 
safety measures?” tests the respondents willingness to contribute. Subsequently we add a 
question to test if  respondents are willing to contribute more if  they expect others also to 
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contribute. The question is: ”How many hours per month and household do you expect other 
households to contribute to help the local community with GLOF safety measures?”. This 
section is finished with the question ”Suppose other households in average contribute twice as 
much as you stated in question 2, would that change your answer and if  so, how much work 
time would you contribute with?” that tests for conditional cooperation given information 
about the other households contribution. The respondents can choose if  they want to change 
their contribution or stay unchanged which tests the unconditional contribution.  
After the questions that elicits the contribution there is a part that investigates the 
determinants of  the contribution. It starts with an ordinal scale question about how large risk 
level the respondents believes they are in. The risk level can be a motivating factor that affects 
the contribution since if  the respondents believes they are at risk of  a GLOF event their 
motivation to contribute is assumed to increase. A question is asked about he amount of  
persons in each household and their ages. The amount of  people old enough to work on 
safety measures can be a socio economic factor of  the contribution. This question is followed 
by socio economic questions that investigates employment rate, occupation and education 
level. A question which investigates if  the respondent owns land investigates if  private 
property at risk is a factor that affects the willingness to contribute. The most sensitive 
question about the respondents income levels comes last. The respondent can choose one of  
the listed income levels that best describes his or hers monthly income. The income levels was 
constructed with assistance by Ganesh Sharma, the contact person of  this paper, and Nepal 
Living Standards Survey (2011) published by Nepals central bureau of  statistics. 
Problems with the survey 
The investigation is hypothetical and will therefore give hypothetical answers since none of  
the respondents are bound to build safety measures after responding. Also there is a problem 
for the respondents to calculate how much work time they can afford to contribute with. 
When calculating the contribution many respondents considered how large their willingness 
was per day and multiplied that value with thirty to calculate their contribution of  work time 
in one month. This way of  calculating can result in very high values if  the respondents 
believe the duration of  the work is only one month. There can also be a warm glow problem 
since it might be morally satisfying to raise the contribution level both in the contribution and 
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conditional contribution questions. (Kolstad, 2011) There will be more outliers in the data of  
a survey with open ended questions than in the data of  a survey with closed ended questions 
(Pearce, Atkinson & Mourato, 2006). Some steps were taken to mitigate the problems with the 
survey. In order to prevent the hypothetical bias the respondents were informed of  the 
different working tasks along the Dudh Kosi in detail and that the answers had to be within 
the respondents time constraints. The respondents was informed that the duration of  the 
policy was until further notice and not only one month. 
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Analysis and results 
The purpose of  the paper is to investigate how many working hours the population of  the 
upper Dudh Kosi valley would contribute to adapt to the effects of  a GLOF event given their 
beliefs about others contribution, and wether they would increase their contribution given 
that they are informed that the other households contribution is twice as high as their own 
contribution. The cross section data was collected by interviewing local sherpa people in 
villages along the Dudh Kosi river between the village of  Namche Bazar and Imja Lake. (A 
map of  the area can be found in appendix 1.) The interviews were translated by a guide. 
Each interview was about ten minutes long and often performed in a kitchen with many 
family members and friends attending.    
The respondents of  the sample 
The control variables that describes the respondents in this paper are the age, male, risk, 
persons, land, full time, education, income and distance to the Lake. All controls represent 
properties that can influence the willingness to contribute with work time due to ability, 
experience, knowledge and perception of  the risk if  you own land or not. The distance to the 
lake should have effect on the amount of  work time the respondent can contribute with. The 
education should give awareness of  effects and problems with climate change and should 
therefore have causal effect on the willingness to contribute. The income should have effect on 
the contribution level. One perspective on the causal effect of  income is that if  the respondent 
have a large income it may have no time to contribute since the respondent gains more utility 
from earning the income rather than contributing with work time. Another way to see this is 
if  the respondent has a large income it can afford to contribute more since the respondent has 
more resources to do so. 
The amount of  respondents of  the sample is 66. The mean age of  the respondents were 34 
years and the median age was 32. This tells us that the distribution of  ages is asymmetrical. 
77 per cent of  the respondents were male and one explanation for the overweight of  male 
respondents can be that four out of  seven villages in the sub population are seasonal 
settlements dominated by men. 54.4 per cent of  the respondents has primary school as 
highest education level and 16.7 per cent has secondary school as highest education level. 
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18.2 per cent of  the respondents has higher secondary school as highest education level and 
10.6 per cent has university as highest education level. These education level rates differs with 
the ICIMOD (2011) education statistics of  the mountain district of  Sankuwhashawa in Nepal 
where 23 per cent of  the household heads completed primary school, nine per cent 
completed secondary school and 0.5 per cent completed university (ICIMOD education, 
2011). The two main occupations amongst the respondents are trekking guide and hotel 
businessman. The mean of  the grouped data of  the respondents income is 13000 Nepal 
rupees per month which is a little bit less than the mean monthly household income 
according to Nepal Living Standards Survey (2011). The share of  respondents with an 
monthly income below 9000 NPR is 24 per cent which is smaller than the Nepal poverty 
headcount at ratio 3.10 USD per day (≈ 9000 NPR per month) of  50 per cent 2010 (World 
bank, 2015). 47 per cent of  the respondents are land owners which is a smaller share than the 
83 per cent described in Nepal Living Standards Survey (2011) and 85 per cent of  the 
respondents work full time. The mean amount of  people above 18 years old in the 
respondents households are 2.2. The mean amount of  people in the respondents households 
under 10 years old is 0.6 and the mean amount of  people between 11 and 17 years old in the 
respondents households is 0.5. The explanation of  the low amount of  children in the 
households can be that so many of  the villages are seasonal settlements where less children 
spend their time. In summation it can be said that the external validity of  the sampled 
respondents are limited since many of  the control variables of  the households differ from the 
average Nepalese population. If  the population frame is changed to the sherpa population 
that lives in high valleys with GLOF risk the representativity can be higher. This paper had 
trouble finding proper statistics of  living standards of  the sherpas and therefore it is hard to 
say if  the sample is representative of  the sherpa population living in high valleys. 
The main variables of  interest 
The main variables of  interest, that can be found in table 3, are the respondents contribution 
of  work hours to adapt to the effects of  GLOF when they are informed about how much the 
other households will contribute (Cond ) and their contribution given their beliefs about the 
other households contribution (Contrib). The contribution of  work hours when the 
respondents are informed of  the other households contribution is defined as the conditional 
contribution of  work time in hours per month. The information should have effect on the 
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contribution since the respondents can use the information to choose how they want to act. 
They can decide not to change their contribution, follow the norm and increase the 
contribution, react to the kindness of  the others and increase the contribution or lower their 
contribution because there is no need for the household to contribute as much as they first 
stated. 
Table 3. Variable names and definitions 
Name	 	 	 	 Definition 
Non_contrib	 	 	 A dummy variable that takes the value of  one if  the 	
	 	 	 	 respondents household does not want to contribute with work 
	 	 	 	 time. Used as a determinant for detecting potential free riders. 
Contrib	 	 	 The respondents households contribution in 		 	
	 	 	 	 hours per month. 
Expect		 	 	 The respondents expectation of  the contribution of  the other 
	 	 	 	 households in hours per month. 
Uncond	 	 	 A dummy variable that takes the value one if  the respondents 
	 	 	 	 household would not change their contribution given that the  
	 	 	 	 other households double the respondents contribution. Used as 
	 	 	 	 a determinant for detecting unconditional contributors. 
Cond_ref	 	 	 Twice amount of  Contrib used as a reference when 		
	 	 	 	 investigating conditional contribution of  work 	 	
	 	 	 	 time in hours per month.  
Cond	 	 	 	 The respondents households conditional contribution of  work 
	 	 	 	 time in hours per month. 
Risk 	 	 	 	 The respondents perceived risk in a scale from one to five. 
The beliefs about the other households contribution is described with the expect variable 
(Expect) which tells how many hours per month the respondent expects the other households 
to contribute with. The belief  of  the other households contribution should have an effect on 
the contribution since if  the respondents believe the others contribution is high they may also 
want to contribute more. This causality might also be reversed since if  the respondents want 
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to contribute with much work time they might also think that the other households should 
have the same willingness and consequently state a higher expectation to justify their own 
level. According to the descriptive statistics of  table 4 the average contribution is 78.6 hours 
per month. Many respondents calculated their contribution level by finding out how many 
hours per day they that corresponded to their willingness and multiplied that value with thirty 
days to calculate the monthly value. There is a possibility that some respondents 
misunderstood the duration of  the contribution. If  the respondent got the impression that the 
duration of  the contribution should be only one month the contribution can be upwards 
biased since the respondents probably would have contributed less if  they thought it was no 
limit to the duration. The interviewer tried to be clear that the duration of  the contribution 
was supposed to be until further notice and not just one month. Another reason for the high 
level of  contribution can be the high endurance of  the sherpas (McDonald, Shrestha, 
Chhetri, Sherpa, Sherpa, Murray & Sanati, 2015). The sherpas willingness to contribute can 
be upwards biased by the satisfaction the respondent gets from showing their capability to the 
others that sat in on the interviews. 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
Variable	 	 Unit	 	 Mean	 	 SD 	 	 Min	 Max	 Freq. 
Non_contrib	 	 %	 	 12.12	 	 32.88	 	 0	 1	 8 
Contrib	 	 Hours/Mo	 78.62	 	 65.37	 	 0	 300	 66 
Expect		 	 Hours/Mo	 79.98	 	 70.87	 	 0	 360	 66 
Uncond	 	 %	 	 6.06	 	 24.04	 	 0	 1	 4 
Cond	 	 	 Hours/Mo	 90.3	 	 78.58	 	 0	 322	 66 
Cond_ref	 	 Hours/Mo	 157.2	 	 130.7	 	 0	 600	 66 
Risk	 	 	 Risk level	 3.439	 	 1.178	 	 1	 5	 66 
The average conditional contribution is 90 hours per month and the average expected 
contribution of  the other households is 80 hours per month. As a comparison reference for 
the respondent the Cond_ref  variable is constructed by doubling the answer of  the 
contribution (Contrib). The mean perceived risk level of  the respondents (Risk) is 3.43 which 
is between medium and large risk on the ordinal scale. This perceived risk level is supposed 
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have a positive effect on the contribution level since if  the risk is higher the respondent should 
be willing to contribute more. The non contributors (No_contrib) are the respondents that do 
not want to contribute. The share of  non contributors amongst the 66 respondents are 12 per 
cent. This can be compared to Kocher et al (2008) results of  8 per cent in the US, 22 per cent 
in Austria and 36 per cent in Japan. The amount of  unconditional contributors was described 
by the variable Uncond. These four respondents answered that they did not want to change 
their contribution when they were presented with the information about the other households 
and are therefore in this paper not considered to act under influence of  any conditions. 
Table 5. Specific descriptive statistics 
Variable 	 	 Unit	 	 Mean	 	 SD	 	 Min	 Max	 Freq. 
Cond (<Contrib)	 Hours/Mo	 53	 	 57.1	 	 41	 148	 10 
Cond (>Contrib)	 Hours/Mo	 113	 	 75.5	 	 16	 322	 48	  
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of  the respondents that have larger or smaller 
conditional contribution than the contribution. This breakdown of  the conditional 
contribution can reveal behavioral factors affecting the conditional contribution. The 
behavior of  the respondents with a conditional contribution lower than their contribution can 
be described by the altruism theory which implies that an individual would decrease its own 
contribution if  informed of  the other households contribution since the need for a 
contribution then is reduced (Sugden, 1984). The behavior of  the respondents with a 
conditional contribution higher than their contribution can be described by conformity which 
is when the respondent is afraid of  breaking the norm created by the other households or 
reciprocity where the respondent is inspired by the kindness of  the other households 
contributions (Rabin,1993). 83 per cent of  the conditional contributors contributed more 
with information and 17 per cent contributed less. In order to further analyze the behavioral 
factors that affects the conditional contribution there must be follow up questions asked. The 
mean of  the conditional contribution that is higher than the contribution is 113 hours per 
month which is a high level of  contribution. This high value can be explained in the same 
way the high average contribution level of  table 4 is explained but also with the addition that 
the Cond_ref  variable might bias the conditional contribution upwards since it in many cases 
was twice a very large contribution of  work time.  
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Econometric analysis 
As a first step of  an econometric analysis a paired t-test shows that the difference between the 
conditional contribution and the contribution is statistically significant at five per cent level. 
Therefore the null hypothesis that the difference between the conditional contribution and 
the contribution is zero can be rejected. The interpretation of  this test is that the informed 
respondent gives a significantly higher contribution than the uninformed and so there exists 
conditional contribution amongst the respondents. This in turn answers the empirical 
question if  the information about the other households changes the respondents contribution.  
The models 
Two linear regression models were constructed to investigate the contribution and the 
conditional contribution. First one describes the how the contribution varies with the beliefs 
of  the other households contribution and the second model describes the contribution given 
the information about the other households contribution. One variable were created out of  
the respondents answers and that was the contribution of  the other households (cond_ref) 
which were twice the own contribution. Another variable was constructed after the data 
collection and that was the distance variable. Some of  the respondents explained they had to 
walk for two days to get to the Imja Lake which meant there might be correlation between the 
contribution level and the distance from the Imja Lake to the respondents home. The 
distance variable had a positive effect of  1.29 hour per month per kilometer in the second 
model but it was not significant (p-value = 0.39). Before eliminating insignificant predictors 
the model 1 regression consisted of  the variables Contrib, Expect, Male, Uncond, Age, Risk, 
Person_0_10, Person_11_17, Person_18_Up, Land, Fulltime, Primary, Secondary, 
Hi_secondary, Inc_9000 Inc_15000 Inc_24000, and Distance. A table of  the full list of  
variable names and definitions can be found in appendix 3. The second model consisted of  
Cond_ref, Male, Uncond, Age, Expect, Risk, Person_0_10, Person_11_17, Person_18_Up, 
Land, Fulltime, Primary, Secondary, Hi_secondary, Inc_9000, Inc_15000, Inc_24000 and 
Distance. The backwards elimination search procedure was used to find the model. The 
procedure includes finding the variable with the lowest t-value and eliminating that variable 
(Cortinhas & Black, 2012). After eliminating this variable a new regression is executed and the 
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process continues until all variables are significant (ibid). The full description of  model 
predictors can be seen in table 6. 
Model 1: 
Contrib = 32.2 + 0.43•Expect*** + 9.66•Risk* – 27.8•Inc_9000* – 40.5•Inc_15000** 
Model 2: 
Cond = 20.3** + 0.51•Cond_ref  *** – 9.57•Person_11_17* – 17.1•Inc_9000* 
Two outliers of  the contribution regression was removed by graphically inspecting the plot of  
the regression for these outliers and removing them. When the outliers was removed the R2 
value increased which is an increase of  the goodness of  fit of  the regression. The closer R2 
gets to 1 the better the fit. The two removed outliers decreased the mean of  the contribution 
from the 78.6 to 75.3 hours per month and the mean of  the expected contribution from 80.0 
to 75.7 hours per month. The variance of  the residuals are expected to be constant and if  
they are not there is heteroscedasticity present. The models were tested for heteroscedasticity 
with the Breusch-Pagan method which detected heteroscedasticity in the second model. Since 
the true variance of  the population is not known the heteroscedasticity problem with the 
second model was adjusted with White’s heteroscedasticity-corrected variances method. 
Heteroscedasticity-corrected variances are also known as robust standard errors. (Gujarati  & 
Porter, 2009) The Ramsey regression specification-error test for omitted variables was used for 
both models in order to detect omitted variables. Both models failed to reject the null 
hypothesis of  this test and therefore it was concluded there were no omitted variables. 
(Hamilton, 2003) 
Model one shows how the households contribution varies with the beliefs of  the other 
households contributions (Expect), the perceived risk level, the respondents income below 
9000 NPR and the respondents income between 9000 and 15000 NPR. The economic 
interpretation of  the first model is that if  the respondents belief  of  the other households 
contribution increases one hour per month the contribution increases 0.43 hours per month 
and if  the respondents perceived risk level increases one nominal degree the contribution 
increases with 9.66 hours per month. If  the respondent has an income below 9000 NPR the 
contribution decreases with 27.8 hours per month and if  the respondent has an income 
between 9000 and 15000 NPR the contribution decreases with 40.5 hours per month. The 
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coefficient of  the expect variable is significant at one per cent level, the coefficient of  income 
between 9000 and 15000 NPR variable is significant at 5 per cents level and the risk- and 
income below 9000 NPR  variables are significant at ten per cent level. 
Table 6. Conditional contribution amongst sherpas below Imja Lake (hours per month) 
Model	 	 	 	 Model 1	 	 	 Model 2 
Variable	 	 	 Contribution 	 	 	 Cond. contribution 
Cond_ref	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.51 (0.03)***	 	 	  
Expect		 	 	 0.43 (0.10)***	 	 	  
Risk	 	 	 	 9.66 (5.57)*	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Person_11_17		 	 	 	 	 	 -9.57 (4.93)* 
Inc_9000	 	 	 -27.8 (14.8)*	 	 	 -17.1 (9.64)* 
Inc_15000	 	 	 -40.5 (15.3)**	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Constant	 	 	 32.2 (20.5)	 	 	 20.3 (9.07)** 
R2	 	 	 	 0.42	 	 	 	 0.79  
Note: This table reports results from a OLS regression of  contribution and conditional contribution on 
socioeconomic determinants. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05,*p<0.1. 
Model two shows how the conditional contribution varies with the information of  the other 
households contribution (Cond_ref) , which is a reference variable that is two times the 
respondents own contribution. It also shows how the conditional contribution varies with the 
income below 9000 NPR and amount of  persons in the household between 11 and 17 years 
of  age. The economic interpretation of  this model is that if  household is informed that the 
other households contribution is two times their own contribution the conditional 
contribution is 1.02 times higher than their own contribution since Cond = 0.51 • 2 • Contrib 
= 1.02 • Contrib. If  the amount of  persons between 11 and 17 years of  age in the household 
increases by one person the conditional contribution decreases by 9.57 hours per month and 
if  the respondent has an income below 9000 NPR the conditional contribution decreases 17.1 
hours per month. The coefficient of  the cond_ref  variable is significant at one per cent level. 
The intercept is significant at a 5 per cent level. The persons between 11 and 17 years of  age 
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in the household and the income below 9000 NPR variables are significant at a ten per cent 
level. 
The analysis establishes the aim of  the paper by answering if  and how the contribution of  the 
respondents in the upper Dudh Kosi valley varies with the beliefs of  the other households 
contribution and also if  and how much the contribution increases if  the respondents are 
informed that the other households contributes twice their contribution. The relationship 
between the beliefs of  the other households contribution and the contribution implies that the 
respondents are more willing to contribute if  they expect a higher contribution level of  the 
other households. It can also be that the respondent want to justify his own contribution level 
with the stated expected level of  contribution according to Ross, Green & House (1977). The 
mean of  the expected contribution of  78.62 hours per month is almost the same as the mean 
of  the contribution of  79.98 hours per month and a paired t-test shows that there is no 
significant difference between the mean of  the expected contribution and the mean of  the 
contribution. This can be interpreted as the sherpas of  the upper Dudh Kosi valley on 
average expect the same contribution of  other households as the contribution of  their own 
household. Since model one shows correlation between the expected contribution and the 
contribution the respondents increase their contribution levels with higher beliefs of  the other 
households contribution. The relationship between the information of  the other households 
contribution and the conditional contribution implies that the respondents are more willing to 
contribute if  they know there is a higher contribution level of  the other households. The 
mean of  the conditional contribution of  90.3 hours per month is higher than the mean of  the 
contribution of  79.98 hours per month. In a comparison between model 1 and model 2 it can 
be seen that the coefficient of  Cond_ref  is a little larger than the coefficient of  Expect 
(0.51>0.43). This means that the respondents will contribute more if  they receive information 
that the other households increased their contribution one hour per month than if  they 
expected the other households to increase their contribution one more hour. Simpler put, the 
respondents contributes a little more if  they are being informed about the other households 
contributions.  
The high level of  the mean contribution can be explained by different biases. One bias can be 
caused by a systematic error when calculating the contribution per month. The respondents 
might have misunderstood the duration of  the policy to be defined as just one month instead 
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of  until further notice and therefore increased their bids. Another bias can be caused by the 
non anonymous interview situation that might bring up the contribution levels due to social 
pressure from the other members of  the group. It was hard to make the interviews 
anonymous since they often were made in the kitchens of  the sherpa homes. Being invited 
into a sherpa kitchen is an honor and starting to ask respondents to leave the kitchen in order 
to improve the interview anonymity might have comprised the interview itself. A translated 
survey version that the respondents could have filled in by themselves would probably have 
made the interviews more anonymous (Patel & Davidson, 2003). The distance to the Lake 
Imja can have a bias effect on the contribution since some respondents might include the time 
it takes to walk to the Imja Lake in their calculation of  the willingness to contribute with work 
time. The distance was regressed and had a considerable effect on both models but since the 
effect was not significant (p=0.61 for model one and p=0.39 for model two) it is hard to draw 
any conclusions about the bias caused by the distance to the Imja Lake. The Cond_ref  
variable that is twice the respondents contribution can be considered unrealistic in the case of  
the respondent states a already high contribution. The Cond_ref  variable was created to see 
if  the respondents got affected by the information of  the other households larger 
contributions and twice the contribution is an easy number to calculate but if  the respondent 
contributes 150 hours per month the Cond_ref  becomes 300 hours per month which is an 
unrealistic contribution of  the other households. Hence the conditional contribution might be 
upwards biased.   
This paper finds some significant socioeconomic factors that affects both the contribution and 
the conditional contribution. The income below 9000 NPR per month lowered both models 
contribution and lowered the contribution at a larger magnitude than the conditional 
contribution. This can be explained by if  the respondent has an income below 9000 NPR per 
month she is more willing to contribute if  she has information about the other households. 
The respondent with the higher income level between 9000 and 15000 NPR per month 
lowers the contribution of  model one even more than the respondents from the lower income 
level. This can be explained by that the respondent with the higher income level between 
9000 and 15000 NPR per month has less time to contribute with work time since the 
respondent gains more utility from earning the income rather than contributing with work 
time. There was no significant coefficient of  the income level between 9000 and 15000 NPR 
per month in the conditional contribution model which could have further emphasized the 
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relation between the contribution levels of  the two incomes. One have to consider that the 
three significant income level predictors of  the two models have large 95 per cent confidence 
intervals which can have large effects on the output of  each model. As an example the 
confidence interval of  the coefficient of  the income level Inc_15000 of  model one is between 
-71.1 and -9.86 (± two standard deviations from predictor value). If  the value of  the 
coefficient is -9.86 the above given interpretation of  the respondents contribution with this 
income level is overthrown. Hence, the model is sensitive for changes in the coefficients. The 
contribution is also affected by the risk level which is expected since if  the respondents 
believes they are at higher risk of  a GLOF event they probably want to contribute with more 
work time to adapt to the negative causes of  such an event. The conditional contribution is 
affected by a factor -9.57 multiplied with how many persons between 11 and 17 years of  age 
the respondent has in the household. This effect is somewhat surprising since it could be 
expected that the more teenagers that can help out in the household the easier it would be to 
contribute with work time but here it is the opposite. Perhaps the explanation can be that it 
takes more effort to take care of  and support hungry teenagers than toddlers and this creates 
a lack of  time for contributing with work time to build adaption measures.  
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Conclusion 
A GLOF event can have catastrophic effects on the living conditions for the sherpas of  the 
upper Dudh Kosi valley. Roads, bridges, live cattle, lives and buildings can be lost and as an 
indirect effect the agriculture, energy and tourist economy can also be affected. Work time 
can be spent on making safety measures like strengthening bridges and roads or controlling 
the glacier dam outlet in a way that decreases the risk. The goal of  this paper was to find out 
how many work hours the sherpa people in the upper Dudh Kosi valley wants to contribute 
to decrease this risk, if  the information about the others makes the household give more and 
how the contribution varies with the beliefs of  the other households contribution. The paper 
also wants to find the causes of  this contribution. This paper finds that the respondents wants 
to contribute a mean of  80.0 hours per month in order to adapt to a future GLOF event. 
This high mean level of  contribution is assumed to be upwards biased by several factors such 
as systematic calculation errors and non anonymous interviews. This paper also finds 
significant evidence of  conditional contribution at a mean level of  90.3 hours per month 
when given information about the other households contribution. This means that if  you are 
informed of  the others contribution you will increase your own contribution. Two significant 
socio economic causes of  the conditional contribution are how many persons between 11 and 
17 years of  age that lives in the household and if  the income level is below 9000 NPR. They 
both have negative effect on the conditional contribution. The paper also finds evidence for a 
relationship between the expected contribution of  other households and the own 
contribution. In other words, if  the household believes that the others will contribute much it 
will also contribute much. The risk has a significant positive effect which means the household 
gives a higher contribution if  it believes it is at higher risk and can therefore be considered a 
motivating factor of  the contribution. Two significant socio economic causes of  the 
contribution are the two lowest income levels and they both have a negative effect on the 
contribution. In the sampled population the share of  non contributors were 12 per cent, the 
unconditional cooperators were 6 per cent and the conditional cooperators were 82 per cent. 
17 per cent of  the conditional cooperators contributed less with information about the others 
households contribution which can be a sign of  altruistic behavior. 83 per cent of  the 
conditional cooperators contributed more when given information of  the other households 
contribution which can be a sign of  conformity or reciprocity behavior. In order to say more 
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of  the nature of  the behavioral factors that affects the contribution there must be more follow 
up questions asked so this paper can only give direction about further investigation.   
This papers contribution to the literature is that it finds how much work time the sherpas of  
upper Dudh Kosi valley wants to contribute to adapt to a future GLOF. Another contribution 
is that this paper uses an elicitation of  conditional contribution with willingness to pay with 
work time instead of  monetary payment. The investigation uses a field experiment in rural 
Nepal with a realistic scenario of  climate change and finds socio economic causes of  the 
conditional cooperation. A shortcoming of  this paper is the small sample size. If  this paper 
had a chance to make the investigation again the limit of  time the respondent is supposed to 
work would be clearly stated and the survey would also be translated. 
Suggestions for further research would be to try to find out how much the sherpa people 
wants to take care of  the glacier as a common resource. This kind of  collective action can 
give them larger access to fresh water and hydro power and as a result give them a higher 
level of  welfare. Another interesting study can be to evaluate how much the sherpas and other 
peoples down stream are willing to pay for the glacier melt water as a resource. The problem 
with this kind of  evaluation is finding a future projection of  the glacier melt water run off  for 
the specific rivers of  Hindu Kush in order to give the correct information of  the scenario of  
such an investigation. Thus it is hard to describe how much less run off  water there will be 
when the glaciers melts down. Furthermore looking at the behavioral economics side of  the 
problem it would be interesting to verify causality between the expectation of  the other 
households contribution and the own contribution. Can it be the expectations of  the other 
households that causes the contribution level or can it be the other way around that the 
household justifies its contribution level with the expectation level? In other words; that the 
respondent believes the other households should have the same attitude as them self  and 
therefore state a higher expectation level to justify their own level. Another interesting topic 
for further research is to find out if  the action of  conditionally contributing really is not 
motivated by self  interest? The papers that make up the background of  this paper states that 
the conditional contribution is not caused by self  interest but mere behavioral causes like a 
reaction to kindness in the reciprocity theory or fear of  being different in the eyes of  the other 
households of  the conformity theory. But being a good contributor in the eyes of  the other 
households can be a rational act well in line with self  interest since the cooperation level of  
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the household can be good for the relations with the other households and maybe also good 
for the business of  that household.  
	 	  
Picture 2. Upper Dudh Kosi river basin. 
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Appendix 1. The map of  the research area 
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Appendix 2. The survey 
Gender:                                       
Age: 
Nationality: 
Information for respondent 
According to the current research the risk of 
future glacier lake outburst floods is increasing in 
this area. The effects involve destruction of 
roads, bridges, buildings and lives. It is possible 
to decrease the effects of a glacier lake outburst 
flood  by safety measures like strengthening 
roads, strengthening bridges, improving structural 
measures to river bank settlements, controlling 
the outlet of the glacier lake dam and 
strengthening the glacier lake dam. You can help 
your local community building these safety 
measures by contributing with your work time. 
1. Will someone in your household be willing to 
contribute with work time to help your local 
community with glacier lake outburst flood safety 
measures? 
☐ Yes 
☐ No  (Please, go to 5.) 
2. How many hours per month is your 
household willing to contribute to help your local 
community with glacier lake outburst flood safety 
measures? ………………………… 
3. How many hours per month and household 
do you expect other households to contribute to 
help the local community with glacier lake 
outburst flood safety measures? ……………………… 
4. Suppose other households in average 
contribute twice as much as you stated in 
question 2, would that change your answer and if 
so, how much work time would you contribute 
with? 
☐ No, I would not change. 
☐ Yes, I would contribute with …….……  hours.  
5. Would you consider your neighborhood to be 
at risk of a glacier lake outburst flood? Risk: 
☐ Very small ☐ Small ☐ Med ☐ Large ☐ Very 
large  
6. How many persons are there in your 
household? Fill in amount. 
0-10 years: ……………………… 
11-17 years: ……………………… 
above 18 years: …………………… 
7. Do you own land in this area? 
☐ Yes 
☐ No 
8. Do you work full time or part time? 
☐ Full time 
☐ Part time 
9. What is your highest level of education? 
☐ Primary  
☐ Lower secondary  
☐ Secondary  
☐ Higher secondary 
☐ University 
10. What is your occupation? ………………………………… 
11. What is your level of income after tax? 
☐ 0 - 9000 NPR / month 
☐ 10000 - 15000 NPR / month 
☐ 16000 - 24000 NPR / month 
☐ 25000 - more NPR / month  
Thank you for your cooperation!  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Appendix 3. List of  variable names and definitions 
Name	 	 	 	 Definition 
Male	 	 	 	 A dummy variable that takes the value of  one if  the respondent 
	 	 	 	 is a male. 
Age	 	 	 	 The respondents age 
Nationality	 	 	 The respondents nationality  
Non_contrib	 	 	 A dummy variable that takes the value of  one if  the 	
	 	 	 	 respondents household does not want to contribute with work 
	 	 	 	 time. Used as a determinant for detecting potential free riders. 
Contrib	 	 	 The respondents households contribution in 		 	
	 	 	 	 hours per month. 
Expect		 	 	 The respondents expectation of  the contribution of  the other 
	 	 	 	 households in hours per month. 
Uncond	 	 	 A dummy variable that takes the value one if  the respondents 
	 	 	 	 household would not change their contribution given that the  
	 	 	 	 other households double the respondents contribution. Used as 
	 	 	 	 a determinant for detecting unconditional contributors. 
Cond_ref	 	 	 Twice amount of  Contrib used as a reference when 		
	 	 	 	 investigating conditional contribution of  work 	 	
	 	 	 	 time in hours per month.  
Cond	 	 	 	 The respondents households conditional contribution of  work 
	 	 	 	 time in hours per month. 
Risk 	 	 	 	 The respondents perceived risk in a scale from one to five. 
Person_0_10	 	 	 How many persons between zero and ten there are in the 	
	 	 	 	 respondents household. 
Person_11_17		 	 How many persons between 11 and 17 there are in the 	
	 	 	 	 respondents household. 
Person_18_Up	 	 How many persons above 18 there are in the 	 	
	 	 	 	 respondents household 
Land	 	 	 	 A dummy variable that takes the value one if  the respondent 
	 	 	 	 owns land in the research area.  
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Appendix 3 continued. 
Fulltime	 	 	 A dummy variable that takes the value one if  the respondent 
	 	 	 	 work fulltime. 
Primary	 	 	 A dummy variable that takes the value one if  the respondent 
	 	 	 	 highest level of  education is primary level. 
Secondary	 	 	 A dummy variable that takes the value one if  the respondent 
	 	 	 	 highest level of  education is secondary level. 
Hi_secondary	 	 	 A dummy variable that takes the value one if  the respondent 
	 	 	 	 highest level of  education is higher secondary level. 
University	 	 	 A dummy variable that takes the value one if  the respondent 
	 	 	 	 highest level of  education is university.  
Occupation	 	 	 A variable that describes the occupation of  the respondent. 
Inc_9000	 	 	 A dummy variable that takes the value one if  the respondents 
	 	 	 	 highest level of  income per month is 9000 NPR. 
Inc_15000	 	 	 A dummy variable that takes the value one if  the respondents 
	 	 	 	 highest level of  income per month is 15000 NPR. 
Inc_24000	 	 	 A dummy variable that takes the value one if  the respondents
	 	 	 	 highest level of  income per month is 24000 NPR. 
Inc_25000	 	 	 A dummy variable that takes the value one if  the respondents 
	 	 	 	 income level is above 25000 NPR. 
Village		 	 	 A variable that describes the village name the respondent lives 
	 	 	 	 in. 
Distance	 	 	 The distance to the Imja Lake from the respondents village.
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